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Abstract 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) bear some responsibility for the financial crisis that started in 
2007 and remains ongoing. This is acknowledged by policymakers, market participants, and 
by the agencies themselves. It soon became clear that, given the depth of the crisis, CRAs 
would not be able to satisfy policymakers by eliminating flaws in their rating methods and 
improving corporate governance. Although the CRAs were more or less unregulated before 
the outbreak of the financial crisis, after the crisis started, politicians became increasingly 
vocal in demanding regulation. Initially, these demands were confined to a more binding 
form of self-regulation. But as the crisis progressed, the calls for state regulation grew ever 
louder. It became apparent after the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington that state 
regulation could no longer be avoided. 
In Europe, the course had been set in this direction even before then. Since European 
policymakers saw the crisis as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon approach to the financial 
markets had failed, they believed they were now strongly placed to have a decisive influence 
on shaping a new international financial order. It is remarkable to note the shift in European 
policy from a self-regulatory approach, which was comparatively liberal in international terms, 
to quite rigorous state regulation of CRAs. Both the European Commission and the 
European Parliament drew up far-reaching plans. Although European policymakers knew 
that only globally consistent regulation would be appropriate for a new world financial order, 
their initial draft legislation was geared more toward stand-alone European regulation. 
While the final version of the European Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies focuses 
firmly on the European arena, the key point for all market participants is that this is unlikely 
to have an adverse effect on the global ratings market. It must nevertheless be recognized 
that the scope of the selected regulatory approach is extremely narrow. Certainly, it has the 
potential to improve the corporate governance of CRAs and prevent conflicts of interests. 
But it can do nothing to address the repeated calls for greater competition or for CRAs to be 
made liable for their ratings. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a broad consensus that credit rating agencies (CRAs) contributed to the current 
financial crisis, which began in the United States (US) in summer 2007 with problems in the 
subprime mortgage market and has since taken on global dimensions. The agencies 
underestimated the credit risk associated with structured credit products and failed to adjust 
their ratings quickly enough to deteriorating market conditions. CRAs were accused of both 
methodological errors and unresolved conflicts of interests, with the result that market 
participants’ confidence in the reliability of ratings was seriously shaken. It is unsurprising, 
against this backdrop, that a heated debate emerged about the rating process, rating 
agencies, competition, and liability rules, prompting calls by politicians for greater regulation 
of CRAs. 
Yet such calls are not solely a product of the present financial turmoil. They have featured on 
the agenda of international financial market policy since, if not before, CRAs came under fire 
in the wake of the series of debt crises starting in 1997. Nevertheless, there was no rush to 
take legislative action. On the contrary, the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies, published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 
2004, sent a clear signal that policymakers preferred a self-regulatory approach. And this 
approach appeared to be successful inasmuch as all the big CRAs subscribed to the Code. 
In the European Union (EU), the approach was supported by a consensus between the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Commission that 
regulation should be put on hold for the time being. This strategy was especially remarkable 
given that 2006 saw the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act subject CRAs in the US to state 
regulation for the first time. 
The phase of self-regulation has now come to an end with the adoption in the EU of the 
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies. Since the financial crisis began, policymakers in 
Europe at both national and European levels have been consistently self-confident in calling 
for Europe to lead the way in international financial market regulation. This paper will 
examine whether and, if so, to what extent this ambition conflicts with the need for any steps 
to improve financial stability—be they in the form of legislation or self-regulation—to be 
based on coordinated international action. 
2.  THE ROLE PLAYED BY CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The growth of the international financial markets over the last twenty years would have been 
unthinkable without CRAs. Only because of the availability of clear, internationally accepted 
indicators of the risk of default were investors willing to invest in international securities—
whether corporate or government bonds—whose credit quality they would have been 
virtually unable to assess on their own. The CRAs worked for decades on designing a simple 
and readily understandable system that would allow any investor to invest in international 
securities with which they were not directly familiar. Where corporate and government bonds 
are concerned, this system has proved reliable and enabled investors to diversify their 
portfolios. 
In the markets for structured products, by contrast, the role of the CRAs goes far beyond 
eliminating information asymmetry. Markets for structured products could not have 
developed without the quality assurance provided by CRAs to unsophisticated investors 
about inherently complex financial products. CRAs have operated as trusted gatekeepers. 
However, the ratings for structured credit turned out to be much less robust predictors of 
future developments than were the ratings for traditional single name securities. 
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Over the past two years, changes in the ratings of structured credit have been far more 
volatile than the historical record for single name credits, and far more weighted toward 
downgrades. The resulting instability of ratings has not only had direct procyclical effects, but 
has undermined confidence in the future stability of credit ratings. Against this backdrop, 
calls for CRAs to be regulated in a new and more stable world financial order fell on fertile 
ground, all the more so given that the CRAs could be accused of making some serious 
errors. A number of official European reports have now described in detail how certain flaws 
in the rating process and the conditions governing the financial markets contributed to the 
crisis. 
The first comprehensive analysis appeared on 7  April 2008, when the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) published its report on enhancing market and institutional resilience (Financial 
Stability Forum 2008). This report concluded that the CRAs’ substantial underestimation of 
the risk inherent in structured finance products was partly due to methodological 
shortcomings. Singled out for criticism were the inadequate historical data, which 
significantly increased model risk, and the fact that CRAs had not taken sufficient account of 
deteriorating lending standards. 
The report took a positive view of the measures already introduced by the CRAs; 
nevertheless, a need was seen for further steps to improve internal governance, the 
transparency of rating procedures, and compliance with international codes of conduct. 
There was criticism, too, of CRAs’ failure to publish verifiable data about their rating 
performance. The agencies were urged to disclose this information in as standardized a form 
as possible. 
The report also called for a distinction to be made between ratings of structured finance 
products and other corporate bonds in order to highlight the differences in the methodologies 
used and the significantly different risk characteristics involved. The FSF felt, however, that 
more in-depth analysis was needed of the implications of such a step for the functioning of 
the market and the regulation of the industry. 
In addition, the FSF report criticized CRAs for failing to adequately monitor the quality of 
securitized products. More rigorous scrutiny of lending practices was therefore called for. 
And last but not least, investors and supervisors were called on to examine whether they 
may have placed too much confidence in ratings. 
Further reports by expert bodies and regulators were published over the course of the 
following twelve months. In October 2008, the President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, mandated Jacques de Larosière to chair a committee to give advice on the 
future of European financial regulation and supervision. In February 2009, the committee 
published a report that cited the following shortcomings (de Larosière Group 2009)
1: 
•  CRAs  lowered the perception of credit risk by giving AAA ratings to the senior 
tranches of structured finance products like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
the same rating they gave to government and corporate bonds yielding 
systematically lower returns. 
•  Flaws in rating methodologies were the major reason for underestimating the credit 
default risks of instruments collateralized by subprime mortgages. The report was 
especially critical of the following factors, which were all felt to have contributed to 
the poor rating performances of structured products: 
o  the lack of sufficient historical data relating to the US subprime market,  
o  the underestimation of correlations in the defaults that would occur during a 
downturn, and  
                                                  
1  The same points are made in the Turner Review issued by the Financial Services Authority (2009: 76). 
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o  an inability to take into account the severe weakening of underwriting 
standards by certain originators. 
•  October 2008 also saw the German government appoint Otmar Issing, former 
Chief Economist at the European Central Bank, to chair a committee to draw up 
recommendations first for the Group of Twenty (G-20) summit in Washington and 
then for the follow-up summit in London. The committee’s report drew attention to 
the part played by various unresolved conflicts of interests (Issing Committee 
2008). It leveled the following criticisms at CRAs: 
•  The governance of credit rating agencies did not adequately address issues 
relating to conflicts of interests and analytical independence. Agencies competing 
for the business of rating innovative new structures may not have ensured that 
commercial objectives did not influence judgments on whether the instruments 
were capable of being rated effectively. 
•  Rating shopping by issuers contributed to a gradual erosion of rating standards 
among structured finance products. This negative effect resulted from the right of 
issuers to suppress ratings that they considered unwelcome, thereby exerting 
pressure on the agencies. 
In March 2009, the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Services Authority published the Turner 
Review, which also highlighted the responsibility of CRAs in its analysis of the causes of the 
financial crisis. The review came to the following conclusions (Financial Services Authority 
2009): 
•  The practice of making the models by which agencies rated structured credits 
transparent to the issuing investment banks created the danger that issuers were 
“structuring to rating,” i.e.,  designing specific features of the structure so that it 
would just clear a certain rating hurdle.
2 
•  The shift to an increasingly securitized form of credit intermediation and the 
increased complexity of securitized credit relied upon market practices that, while 
rational from the point of view of individual participants, increased procyclicality in 
the system. 
o  More securitization meant that a greater proportion of credit assets were held 
by investors seeking reassurance from credit ratings, and thus increased the 
potential aggregate effects of forced selling by institutions using predefined 
investment rules based on ratings. 
o  The use of market value or rating-based triggers increased in an attempt to 
improve investor and creditor protection.
3 
                                                  
2  The Issing Committee report makes a similar point, noting that ratings assigned to structured products are 
based on estimating the loss distribution of the underlying loan portfolio. These estimations rely on models that 
are not fully transparent to the industry. However, rating agencies provided “customer end” tools to their clients, 
which allowed banks to run pre-tests of their new securitization portfolios before submission to the agency. As 
a result, loan portfolios could be designed in a way that just met the criteria included in the relevant model, but 
may have additional risk pertaining to criteria not included in the model. As an example, consider information 
on whether first loss tranches are retained or not. Although we know that the sale of the so-called first loss 
piece lowers expected portfolio returns, this is not an explicit part of the rating model currently in use, and is 
therefore not reflected in the assigned rating. Hence, the issuer can raise its profits by selling first loss pieces, 
without disclosure to the investors. This gaming argument refers to structured finance products only, not to 
corporate bonds in general. The reason is that in structured finance, the tailoring of portfolio composition is 
feasible (easy, low cost), while it is infeasible (difficult, expensive) if the underlying asset pool is an entire 
corporation with its fixed assets (Issing Committee 2008). 
3  Senior notes of structured investment vehicles (SIVs), for instance, were often awarded high credit ratings on 
the basis that, if the asset value fell below defined triggers, the SIV would be wound up before senior note 
holders were at risk. At the system level, however, this resulted in attempted simultaneous asset sales by 
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o  Arrangements that related the level of collateral posted in derivative contracts 
to the credit ratings of counterparties also had a significant procyclical effect.
4 
In summary, the following elements may be said to have had an adverse influence on the 
quality of CRAs’ work: 
•  Overreliance on mathematical and statistical methodologies based on inadequate 
data, 
•  Insufficient consideration of market and macroeconomic developments as factors 
influencing ratings, 
•  Failure to take account of interdependencies, 
•  Disregard of conflicts of interests, and 
•  Inadequate disclosure practices with regard to models and model assumptions. 
This outline of the ratings dilemma would be inaccurate if it were to focus only on 
shortcomings on the part of CRAs. It is also true that investors often accepted ratings 
uncritically and overestimated their significance. Not enough attention was paid to the fact 
that ratings are only estimates of the relative probability of default or expected loss on a debt 
instrument. They are not a detailed assessment of risk and say nothing about an 
instrument’s price quality or liquidity. Ratings are no substitute for investment risk 
management, particularly as the information provided by CRAs is limited.
5 
3.  REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: WHY 
AND HOW? 
“Credit rating agencies are the biggest uncontrolled power in the global financial system, and 
thus in the national financial system too,” said the President of the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) as early as 2003 at a hearing before the German parliament’s 
finance committee (Deutscher Bundestag 2003). In the US too, a growing number of voices 
argued for CRAs to be regulated in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom affairs. The calls 
for regulation that emerged during the present financial crisis and the measures now 
introduced did not therefore come out of the blue. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what the 
regulation of CRAs is intended to achieve. 
One of the reasons for this is almost certainly that ratings fulfill several roles in the 
international financial markets. The question of whether and, if so, how CRAs should be 
regulated is therefore determined not least by the numerous potential areas of conflict with 
the state. If CRAs are regarded as normal companies, the focus will be on the lack of 
competition and efficiency arguments. If ratings-based regulation is taken as the starting 
point for consideration of the issue, the state will be interested in a smoothly functioning, 
reputable system delivering ratings of high quality. Conflicts of interests that adversely affect 
quality are also a concern. In addition, ratings make it easier to establish and enforce legal 
rights (see Gonzalez et al. 2004). And if the financial system as a whole is considered, 
structural problems such as exacerbating procyclicality will play a role. The various 
                                                                                                                                                     
multiple SIVs, and the rapid disappearance of liquidity (both for asset sales and for new funding) as market 
value limits were triggered and ratings were cut (Financial Services Authority 2009). 
4  Credit default swaps and other over the counter derivative contracts entered into by AIG, for instance, required 
it to post more collateral if its own credit rating fell. When this occurred in September 2008, a downward spiral 
of increased liquidity stress and falling perceived creditworthiness rapidly ensued (Financial Services Authority 
2009). 
5 See also the de Larosière Group report (2009: 16). “But the use of ratings should never eliminate the need for 
those making investment decisions to apply their judgement. A particular failing has been the acceptance by 
investors of ratings of structured products without understanding the basis on which those products were 
provided.” 
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arguments for regulating CRAs have been described extensively in academic literature and 
need not be pursued further here (see, for example, Dittrich 2007; Emmenegger 2006; Hill 
2004). 
The financial crisis has revealed elements justifying regulation in all of the above functions 
performed by ratings. Where structured products were concerned, information asymmetry 
was reduced far less than investors had anticipated. The gatekeeper role led to conflicts of 
interests and the use of ratings both to enforce legal rights and for prudential purposes 
increased procyclicality. 
Any approach to regulating CRAs must therefore address the question of what should be 
regulated and with which tools—in other words how. Regulation will only succeed if it takes 
account of what ratings can and cannot achieve. A rating of a financial instrument provides 
information about the credit quality, i.e., the probability of default, of a specific company or 
financial product. It says nothing about “systemic risk”—that is to say the danger of a chain 
reaction resulting in a number of financial institutions getting into difficulties. 
It may thus be concluded that, while it may be perfectly rational for individual firms and 
institutional investors to be guided by a rating when making their investment decisions, these 
decisions can destabilize the financial markets at a systemic level if downgrades and rating 
triggers result in mass selling, write-downs, and additional capital requirements. The key 
point determining whether systemic risk arises is consequently the extent to which individual 
defaults occur at the same time. Ratings provide no information about this. Hence, it would 
be a mistake to believe that regulating CRAs could have mitigated procyclicality. Regulating 
credit rating agencies can do nothing to solve the problems caused by using ratings for 
regulatory purposes. Lawmakers should therefore refrain from overreacting. Instead, they 
should consider enhancements to current regulation that will work in a prosperous economy 
as well as in challenging times. 
Conversely, the objective of regulating CRAs can only be to make ratings more reliable and 
mitigate conflicts of interests. On the question as to how to achieve this objective, there is 
broad consensus that rating methodologies should not be monitored. This is not only for 
competitive reasons, but above all because regulation of this kind could result in the state 
being considered partly responsible for published ratings. This would be incompatible with 
the concept of private-sector credit rating agencies. Given that states themselves are also 
issuers of debt, moreover, a new conflict of interests would arise if the state were in a 
position to influence the methodologies used for assigning sovereign ratings. 
The range of possible methods of regulation nevertheless remains extremely broad. At one 
end of the spectrum is the idea that CRAs should regulate themselves. At the other end, 
there are demands for the rating process to be entrusted to the public sector. Support for the 
latter solution is not only to be found on the political left;
6 it is evidently also favored by some 
academics. For instance, in an article published on 14 May 2009 on Spiegel-Online, the 
Internet edition of a German news magazine, the German economics professor and member 
of the German Council of Economic Experts Peter Bofinger called for the introduction of 
state credit rating agencies to prevent misjudgments of the kind made before the present 
financial crisis (Spiegel-Online 2009). 
Between self-regulation and state credit rating agencies lies the model of state-regulated 
private-sector CRAs. While the introduction of state agencies may be excluded simply for the 
reason that the state would then also have to assume liability for ratings, the other two 
alternatives remain the subject of heated discussion. For a long time, policymakers accepted 
the arguments against state regulation. In Europe, it was only the present financial crisis that 
led to reconsideration. 
                                                  
6 In a motion before the federal parliament of 15 November 2007, for example, the German Left Party (Die Linke) 
called for the creation of impartial, public-sector credit rating agencies (Deutscher Bundestag 2007). 
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From a market economy perspective, there is much to be said for self-regulation, 
i.e., allowing CRAs to set their own code of conduct. However, the success of any self-
regulatory regime stands or falls with the question of control. First, there needs to be 
effective supervision to reveal deviations from the self-imposed rules. Second, there must be 
a mechanism to sanction deviations. Self-regulation in the credit rating industry is only an 
option if it fulfils both requisites. The obvious supervision tool is rating quality (see Dittrich 
2007: 147). This is an instrument that can be easily monitored by market participants and the 
media. And investors, for their part, will only accept reliable ratings over the long term. The 
second requisite is also met by the quality criterion. CRAs are highly sensitive to poor 
informational quality and proven anticompetitive behavior because both lower issuers’ 
willingness to buy ratings. A loss of reputation will endanger the business of any CRA, so it 
is a highly effective form of sanction. The supporters of this hypothesis—and these include 
the vast majority of market participants—have considered self-regulation on the basis of the 
IOSCO Code sufficient up to now. 
For the advocates of state regulation, a key lesson to be learned from the current turmoil is 
that it is vital for ratings to be able to provide a reliable indication of a debtor’s 
creditworthiness even in times of crisis. In their view, the present crisis proves that the self-
disciplining role played by reputation cannot always be relied on and only functions over the 
long term. Self-regulation does not work effectively when the pressure of reputation as a 
controlling power exists only to a limited degree due to a lack of competition (see Blaurock 
2007). In addition, the argument goes, a rating does not only buy an issuer information. It 
should not be forgotten that ratings also regulate market access. Against this backdrop, 
CRAs have not managed to demonstrate that they are able under the existing regime to 
successfully resolve conflicts of interests. State regulation advocates feel that, in the interest 
of financial market stability, the current market failure justifies state regulation. 
4.  REGULATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS 
From the outset, market participants have had reservations about state regulation of CRAs. 
They believe it is first and foremost the responsibility of the rating agencies themselves to 
remedy the shortcomings that came to light in the financial crisis and repair their damaged 
reputation. This calls, in particular, for modifications to rating procedures, improved 
transparency, and a review of internal processes in the interest of high quality. 
This is seen as the key prerequisite for ensuring that the securitizations market will function 
smoothly over the long term. In the view of market participants, the financial crisis does not 
change the fact that securitization has contributed significantly to the efficiency of the 
financial markets. Securitization allows risk to be spread more broadly and enables many 
categories of investor to diversify their investments more widely. It also facilitates improved 
risk management among issuers. This presupposes that risks have been accurately 
assessed. 
The CRAs were aware of this problem and responded swiftly. They revised their models and 
the rating of originators, insurers, servicers, and law firms. They also expanded their 
disclosure practices, launched various consultations with market participants on 
methodological issues, subjected their internal structures and processes to a thorough 
analysis, and made certain adjustments. As a result, the risk of a repeat of the developments 
in the credit rating industry that led to the subprime crisis has doubtless fallen. 
Market participants have nevertheless recognized  that the rating process unquestionably 
contains incentive structures that can—at least in theory—encourage misconduct by 
agencies. Owing to the lack of competition in the ratings market, the pressure that clients 
can potentially exert is not, on its own, enough to force rating agencies to behave properly. 
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Even so, regulative action should be taken with care. It should always be capable of 
achieving the twin objectives of ensuring financial market stability and promoting the 
efficiency of the financial markets. No one will be helped by tight regulation that stifles 
innovation and growth in the financial sector. Regulation is not an end in itself. 
It should also be borne in mind that national responses to these challenges will not suffice. 
Even the EU would be a suboptimal stage for action because ratings are usually addressed 
to investors worldwide. For these reasons, the supervision of CRAs should be globally 
consistent; on no account should ratings be influenced by having to meet differing regulatory 
requirements. This would destroy the international comparability of ratings, which is one of 
their key contributions to financial market efficiency, and there would be competitive 
distortions between issuers and financial centers. 
In the absence of an international regulator, a consistent approach to regulating CRAs can 
be achieved only by coordinating the rules at international level. The IOSCO Code of 
Conduct represents such an internationally coordinated set of rules. This should therefore be 
the basis of any state regulation. 
5.  THE REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
5.1  The Importance of the IOSCO Code 
In 2004, the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies were published by 
IOSCO (2004) in response to the CRAs’ failings in the Enron and WorldCom affairs. They 
set out rules on ensuring the quality and integrity of the rating process, including the 
monitoring of ratings; on guaranteeing appropriate internal procedures and analyst 
independence in order to avoid conflicts of interests; on making sure that rating methods are 
transparent and that ratings can be adjusted if necessary without delay; on handling 
confidential information; and on disclosing the extent to which CRAs follow the Code. These 
rules were of a general nature; they did not prescribe methodological details such as ratios, 
models, or rating categories. For good reason, this was left to the agencies themselves. 
The expectation was that the CRAs would incorporate the IOSCO Code into their own codes 
of conduct or explain in clear terms why certain aspects had not been adopted (“comply or 
explain”). Though the competent authorities monitored compliance with the Code, there was 
no sanctions mechanism. The Code provided the credit rating industry with an internationally 
accepted framework of self-regulation. Most CRAs—including the three market leaders—
implemented the Code, often verbatim. 
5.2  The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the US 
In the US, CRAs are officially registered as nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (NRSROs) if they satisfy the requirements set by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC); they are subject to extensive vetting. The SEC requirements incorporate 
many elements of the IOSCO Code. 
The NRSRO system was introduced in 1975 and fundamentally revised in 2006. The 
approval process became a registration process. While this made it easier to obtain 
recognition as an NRSRO, the criteria to be met by agencies under the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act were significantly tightened (US Congress 2006). Since 2008, CRAs have been 
subject to SEC oversight in the form of disclosure requirements, among other things, and 
liability has been increased. CRAs are now held accountable for compliance with their own 
standards, which they file with the SEC (see Partnoy 2009; Dittrich 2007). Areas covered by 
the rules include the misuse of confidential information, the management of conflicts of 
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interests, a ban on certain practices, the appointment of a compliance officer and the 
disclosure of the agencies’ financial development. The SEC has extensive powers to enforce 
these rules. Regulation in the US thus goes somewhat further than the IOSCO Code. Some 
of the Code’s provisions are enshrined in law or in regulations issued by US supervisors and 
consequently have a more stringent effect than is the case in the EU, for example. 
Interference by the SEC in the methodologies used by CRAs is strictly prohibited, however: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Commission nor any State (or 
political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures 
and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
determines credit ratings.”
7 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act may definitely be deemed a success. Since its 
introduction, there has been a significant increase in the number of registered CRAs. While 
previously only the big three rating agencies were registered as NRSROs, 2008 saw ten 
agencies apply for and obtain NRSRO status from the SEC (2008a).
8 
5.3  The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the EU 
Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the regulatory setup in Europe was based mainly 
on self-regulation within certain supervisory “crash barriers” in the form of the IOSCO Code. 
In 2005, the CESR recommended the European Commission not to regulate the credit rating 
industry at EU level for the time being. Instead, it proposed adopting a pragmatic approach 
and reviewing how CRAs implemented the standards set out in the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
(CESR 2005). CESR therefore drew up a strategy on the basis of voluntary compliance by 
CRAs and in December 2005 issued a press release outlining a process to review 
implementation of the IOSCO Code. This framework, agreed with the main CRAs operating 
in the EU, included the following three elements: 
•  an annual letter from each CRA to be sent to CESR, and made public, outlining 
how it had complied with the IOSCO Code and indicating any deviations from the 
Code; 
•  an annual meeting between CESR and the CRAs to discuss any issues related to 
implementation of the IOSCO Code; and 
•  an undertaking for CRAs to provide an explanation to their national CESR member 
if any substantial incident occurred with a particular issuer in their market. 
Four rating agencies agreed to this voluntary framework (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch 
Ratings, and Dominion Bond). In January 2006 the European Commission concluded that no 
new legislative proposals were needed as things stood. The European Commission 
considered that the existing financial services directives, combined with self-regulation by 
the agencies on the basis of the IOSCO Code, were sufficient to address all major issues of 
concern in relation to CRAs (see European Commission 2006). 
Against this backdrop, the CESR (2006) and the European Securities Markets Expert 
(ESME) Group (2008)—both on behalf of the European Commission—presented proposals 
that appeared to show a way to keep up the required pressure. 
On top of this, however, CRAs are also regulated directly in the EU by the Capital 
Requirements Directive, which implements Basel II in Europe. In practice, only the big three 
agencies are affected. 
                                                  
7 See Securities Exchange Acts of 1934 Art. 15E (2). 
8  The ten agencies: A.M. Best Company, Inc.; Dominion Bond Rating Service Ltd.; Fitch, Inc.; Japan Credit 
Rating Agency, Ltd.; Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.; Rating and Investment Information, Inc.; Standard & 
Poor’s Rating Services; Egan-Jones Rating Company; LACE Financial Corp.; and Realpoint LLC. 
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To be recognized as an external credit assessment institution (ECAI) under the standardized 
approach of the Basel II Capital Framework, an agency’s rating methods must satisfy criteria 
set by supervisors concerning objectivity, independence, continuous monitoring, and 
transparency. ECAI recognition is a prerequisite for banks being able to use the agency’s 
ratings to calculate their risk-weighted assets in accordance with the Capital Requirements 
Directive. A CRA may be recognized by supervisors if its rating methodology meets the 
following requirements:  
•  ratings must be objective—the methodology used must, in particular, be systematic 
and subject to some form of validation; 
•  the process should be free from political influence and economic pressure; 
•  ratings should be reviewed at least once a year; and 
•  general information about the methodology should be documented and publicly 
available. 
It must be possible for supervisors to monitor the frequency with which methodologies are 
reviewed (see Everling and Trieu 2007: 109). 
In addition, ratings 
•  should be judged credible and reliable by users, and 
•  should be available to all institutions with a legitimate interest in them on the same 
terms. 
These criteria do not interfere in the methodologies used by CRAs but are general quality 
standards, which are admittedly monitored. They apply solely for prudential purposes. 
6.  POLITICAL DEMANDS AND CONCLUSIONS IN LIGHT 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Market participants’ appeals to continue to rely on the ability of CRAs to regulate themselves 
were partially taken on board by those in positions of political responsibility. Though state 
regulation was called for, this was to be based on the IOSCO Code. On 29 January 2008, for 
example, a joint communiqué by the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, and UK and the 
President of the European Commission called for “…  improvements in the information 
content of credit ratings to increase investors’ understanding of the risks associated with 
structured products, and for action to address potential conflicts of interests for rating 
agencies. While preferring market-led solutions, such as the amendment of the IOSCO Code 
of Conduct, if market participants prove unable or unwilling to rapidly address these issues 
we stand ready to consider regulatory alternatives” (Office of the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, 2008). 
At a relatively early stage, therefore, policymakers put pressure on the CRAs to propose 
concrete improvements and demonstrate that steps were being taken to eliminate 
shortcomings. Some governments, however, most notably that of France, went as far as to 
demand that CRAs be tightly regulated. 
And as the financial crisis deepened, the will to regulate became increasingly entrenched. 
The foundations for regulatory measures were laid by the G-20 summits in Washington, DC 
and London. In the final declaration of the Washington summit, the participants stated: “We 
will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies, consistent with the agreed and 
strengthened international code of conduct” (G-20 2008). In the view of the G-20 leaders, the 
objective of state regulation was to prevent conflicts of interests. The G-20 resolutions 
published in London on 2 April 2009 fleshed out the steps to be taken and made them more 
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binding by setting an implementation deadline. By the end of 2009, for example, a system of 
supervising and registering CRAs was to be established in all G-20 states (G-20 2009). 
Both before and after the G-20 summits, various national and international bodies put 
forward a number of proposals reflecting an astonishingly broad range of potential forms of 
regulation. 
In Germany, the Issing Committee (2008) proposed measures in the following areas: 
•  Rating performance should be monitored by regulators, applying high statistical 
standards. Rating performance relative to outcomes should be published regularly 
(e.g., annually). 
•  To minimize rating shopping, unsolicited ratings should be encouraged (e.g., by 
mandatory rating disclosure). 
•  The use of structured finance ratings in public regulation, e.g.,  Basel  II or 
consumer protection regulation, should be reconsidered (and dropped if 
necessary) in order to limit the pressure on CRAs. 
•  Agencies should be encouraged to adjust their rating methodology to innovations 
in the financial industry, e.g., to flag structured finance ratings or reveal incentive 
alignment and first loss piece retention as part of rating information. 
•  Rating fees should be linked to rating performance. 
•  An annual report on rating practices and rating competition by a central oversight 
body might help both to monitor market quality and draw attention to outstanding 
analytical uncertainties of which investors might be unaware. 
•  The activities of CRAs should be monitored, among other things by implementing a 
code of conduct. 
Ahead of the G-20 London summit, the Issing Committee (2009) went a step further and 
proposed, in addition, that 
•  internationally active rating agencies should be registered with an institution 
entrusted with capital market oversight, e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
or Bank for International Settlements (BIS); 
•  on a regular basis, agencies should deposit their rating assessments with the 
entrusted institution, which should undertake a thorough statistical analysis of this 
data and publish regular rating default and rating migration tables; 
•  these assessments should be disclosed to markets and investors; and 
•  a high-level, open annual event should discuss the status of the rating industry and 
its performance. The use of designated expert panels in a public dialogue with 
issuers, investors, and regulators should help to maintain the right level of 
awareness and to stimulate regulatory and industry debate about rating practices. 
While the Issing Committee recognized that only globally consistent regulation would 
improve the stability and efficiency of the international financial markets, the de Larosière 
Report sought to provide the European Commission with a basis for the EU Regulation on 
Credit Rating Agencies, which was already under preparation. The report’s 
recommendations were as follows (de Larosière Group 2009): 
•  CRAs must be regulated effectively to ensure that their ratings are independent, 
objective, and of the highest possible quality. 
•  The CESR should be entrusted with the task of licensing and supervising CRAs in 
the EU. 
10 ADBI Working Paper 188    Utzig 
•  A fundamental review of CRAs’ economic models should be conducted, notably in 
order to eliminate the conflicts of interests that currently exist. The modalities of a 
switch from the current “issuer pays” model to a “buyer pays” model should be 
considered at the international level. 
•  Consideration should be given to the ways in which the formulation of ratings could 
be completely separated from the advice given to issuers on the engineering of 
complex products. 
•  The use of ratings required by some financial regulations should be significantly 
reduced over time. 
•  Regulators should keep a close eye on the performance of CRAs with the 
recognition and allowable use of their ratings made dependent on their 
performance. CESR should, on an annual basis, approve those CRAs whose 
ratings can be used for regulatory purposes. Should the performance of a given 
CRA be insufficient, its activities could be restricted or its license withdrawn by 
CESR. 
•  The rating of structured products should be changed, with a new, distinct code 
alerting investors to the complexity of the instrument. 
•  Supervisors should check that financial institutions have the capacity to 
complement the use of external ratings (on which they should no longer 
excessively rely) with sound independent evaluations.
9 
Early 2009 also saw concrete proposals on regulating CRAs emerge from the UK. The 
Turner Review, which set out the proposals of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) for 
ensuring a stable global banking system, included some recommendations concerning 
CRAs. Basically, the FSA supported the main points of the European Commission’s draft 
regulation. In addition, it saw a need to ensure that ratings were only used for purposes to 
which they were suited. In particular, the FSA (2009: 78) took the view 
•  that the rating agencies themselves should improve communication relating to the 
purpose of ratings, emphasizing that they cannot be treated as carrying inferences 
for liquidity and price; and that 
•  public policy should avoid unnecessary requirements for investing institutions to 
hold securities of a specific rating. 
At the same time, the FSA warned against undue expectations of what regulation could 
achieve. It pointed out, in particular, that regulating CRAs would have only limited success in 
reducing the procyclical impact of prudential rules. While changes in regulatory policy 
relating specifically to rating agencies had an important role to play, the FSA nevertheless 
believed that other factors might have a bigger influence on the use of ratings and on the 
extent to which procyclical dangers could be offset. 
As well as advocating state regulation of CRAs, policymakers also called for more 
competition in the industry. Especially popular among German politicians is the idea of 
establishing a European CRA as a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon agencies currently 
dominating the market. This proposal has been discussed in Germany for many years and 
has most recently been touted at the highest level as a solution to the shortcomings 
displayed by CRAs in the financial crisis. Not only Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück, but also 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has championed the plan. 
In summer 2008 Chancellor Merkel told the Financial Times (2008): “Europe has developed 
a certain independence thanks to the euro [but] in terms of the rules, the transparency 
guidelines and the entire standardisation of financial markets, we still have a strongly Anglo-
                                                  
9 For proposals on a far-reaching extension of CRA regulation, see also Partnoy (2009). 
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Saxon-dominated system … I think that in the medium term Europe will need a working 
rating agency because the robust currency system of the euro has not yet secured sufficient 
influence over the rules governing financial markets.”
10 
There was some amount of European agreement on this point. At the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde also called for a European 
alternative to existing CRAs. Germany even made a proposal at the G8 summit in Japan to 
establish a European CRA to compete with market leaders Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
And while debating the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on Credit Rating 
Agencies, the European Parliament discussed various legislative options for forcing 
investors to use ratings issued by a European credit rating agency. 
The idea of a European CRA first needs to be assessed against the objective of encouraging 
competition in an oligopolistic market. Given the mistakes made by the CRAs in rating 
structured products, calls for more reliable ratings were inevitable. In a “normal” market, 
improvements in quality are driven by competition. Demands for additional CRAs to compete 
with the players dominating the market are therefore understandable. It is unlikely, however, 
that competition to provide the best quality can be achieved by means of a European rating 
agency protected and supported by European regulation. This is not the way to promote the 
emergence of a strong competitor. The notion that such an agency would issue better (and 
more Europe-friendly) ratings is based on a fundamental misconception about the role and 
functioning of CRAs. 
Contrary to policymakers’ intentions, the creation of a European CRA could result in 
investors considering the ratings of European companies and structured finance products to 
be of lower quality than the ratings of companies in other regions. This would have an 
adverse effect on the funding opportunities and costs of European firms and would weaken 
the EU financial market. An inappropriate attempt of this kind to boost competition in the 
ratings market could thus damage the reputation of credit ratings as a whole and fly in the 
face of the actual objective of state regulation. 
7.  REGULATORY MEASURES INTRODUCED DURING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
7.1  Revision of the IOSCO Code 
The financial crisis led financial regulators to conclude that provisions of the IOSCO Code 
were inadequate. As a result, the Code was fundamentally revised in 2008. The changes 
made were intended to address issues that arose in relation to the activities of CRAs in the 
market for structured finance products. Although the IOSCO Code still contains no specific 
rules concerning methodologies, it now sets out extensive disclosure requirements aimed at 
enabling both investors and regulators to gain better insight into ratings and avoid an 
excessive reliance on CRAs at the expense of their own judgment. The main changes in the 
revised Code are as follows (see IOSCO 2008a). 
To protect the quality and integrity of the rating process, CRAs should:  
•  prohibit CRA analysts from making proposals or recommendations regarding the 
design of structured finance products that the CRA rates; 
•  ensure the quality of the information needed for ratings and inform users about the 
limitations of the rating; 
•  periodically review the methodologies and models they use; 
                                                  
10 In June 2009 the German Federal President demanded in a speech a European public rating agency. See 
Köhler (2009). 
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•  ensure that the decision-making process for rating action is conducted in an 
objective manner; 
•  ensure that rating analysts have appropriate knowledge and experience; 
•  establish procedures to review the feasibility of providing ratings for new 
structures; 
•  ensure that methodologies and models for determining credit ratings of structured 
products are appropriate when the risk characteristics of the assets underlying a 
structured product change materially; and 
•  ensure that adequate resources are allocated to monitoring and updating their 
ratings. 
To ensure CRA independence and avoidance of conflicts of interests, CRAs should: 
•  state whether issuers will publicly disclose all relevant information about the 
product being rated; 
•  disclose whether any client accounts for more than 10% of the CRA’s annual 
revenue; 
•  review the past work of analysts that leave the CRA; 
•  review remuneration policies to ensure the objectivity of the CRA’s rating process; 
and 
•  define what they do and do not consider to be an ancillary business and why. 
Regarding their responsibilities to the investing public and issuers, CRAs should: 
•  publish historical information about the performance of their rating opinions; 
•  differentiate ratings of structured finance products from other ratings, preferably 
through different rating symbols; 
•  indicate the attributes and limitations of each credit opinion; 
•  provide investors with sufficient information so that an investor can understand the 
basis for the CRA’s rating; and 
•  disclose the principal methodology or methodology version used in determining a 
rating. 
This was not the end of the response to the financial crisis by international supervisors, 
however. At the end of July 2008, IOSCO (2008b) published a statement announcing that a 
task force would explore possible cooperation between its members with the aim of ensuring 
that CRAs disclosed information in the due and complete form envisaged by the IOSCO 
Code. The tightening of regulatory requirements culminated in the following announcement 
in September: “IOSCO favours a consistent global regulatory approach to monitoring the 
activities of CRAs. It urges legislators to consider the regulatory consensus represented by 
the IOSCO Code of Conduct when framing legislation as any fragmentation runs the risk of a 
recurrence of problems with product ratings” (IOSCO 2008c). Financial supervisors thus 
paved the way for the formal regulation of credit rating agencies. 
7.2  Revision of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
In the US, the SEC sought during the financial crisis to further improve the regulation of 
CRAs. In June 2008, it released a report outlining serious deficiencies in the ratings process. 
It subsequently adopted new rules designed to increase the transparency of NRSRO rating 
methodologies, strengthen NRSRO disclosures of ratings performance, prohibit certain 
NRSRO conflicts of interests, and enhance NRSRO recordkeeping. NRSROs were required 
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to start making publicly available their rating histories in the form of a random sample of 10% 
of issuer-paid ratings for each class of ratings. 
At the end of 2008, building on earlier rulemakings, the SEC adopted requirements to 
enhance NRSRO transparency and further address potential NRSRO conflicts of interests 
(see SEC 2008b). It also proposed additional rules (see SEC 2008c), which were introduced 
in April 2009. 
7.3  Measures in the EU 
After the outbreak of the financial crisis, the European Commission asked CESR to prepare 
a report on problems associated with credit ratings. CESR was instructed to focus on the 
following issues: 
•  the transparency of rating methodologies, 
•  number and expertise of staff at CRAs, 
•  regular monitoring of ratings and topicality of rating actions, and 
•  potential conflicts of interests (e.g., remuneration schemes at CRAs). 
In addition, the Commission requested ESME to examine credit ratings in the securities 
market. CESR (2008) made the following recommendations on regulating CRAs: 
•  The IOSCO Code should be a minimum standard. 
•  An international body should be established to set standards for CRAs on the basis 
of the IOSCO Code and monitor compliance. The names of CRAs deviating from 
the Code should be made public (“name and shame”). Issuers, investors, and 
investment firms should be represented on the body. CRAs’ participation in this 
body should be limited to involvement in drawing up the standards. Members of the 
body should be appointed by the international supervisors to which the body would 
report. 
•  CRAs should deliver the necessary information. 
•  If this international body cannot be set up at short notice, a European authority 
reporting to CESR should be established. 
•  Only if market participants fail to provide the necessary support or if the body is 
unable to adequately ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings should 
financial supervisors consider further measures, including regulation. 
•  The European Commission should set the process in motion as soon as possible. 
In the event of undue delay, regulatory action should be taken. 
In its report, CESR (2008: 3) concluded that: “there is no evidence that regulation of the 
credit rating industry would have had an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings of 
US subprime backed securities and [CESR] hence continues to support market driven 
improvement.” 
CESR nevertheless took the view that greater commitment was required on the part of 
market participants and CRAs if the necessary discipline was to be ensured. It also pointed 
out that the use of ratings for regulatory purposes could result in excessive confidence being 
placed in ratings. 
The IOSCO Code remained the relevant benchmark for the credit rating industry, although 
CESR now considered it merely a minimum standard on which to base an extended model 
aimed essentially at refining and enforcing the Code. 
ESME (2008) believed that the CRAs themselves had to solve the problem of the loss in 
confidence. It saw no regulatory magic bullet. On the contrary, full, formal regulation might 
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result in credit ratings being trusted to a point that could not possibly be justified. ESME 
therefore recommended revising the IOSCO Code and adding provisions to remedy the 
problems that had come to light in the rating of structured finance products. In addition, 
ESME recommended that the Code be complemented by the external monitoring of CRAs’ 
corporate governance, and that an advisory group be set up to report to CESR. 
8.  THE EU REGULATION ON CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
At the political level, developments in the EU fast outpaced the recommendations of CESR 
and ESME. The end of July 2008 saw the European Commission launch consultations on 
regulating CRAs and this was followed in November 2008 by the publication of a proposal 
for an EU regulation. After controversial discussions in the European Parliament and the 
European Council, the Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies was adopted by the Parliament 
on 23 April 2009, approved by the Council of Ministers on 5 May and now applies directly in 
all member states (European Parliament 2009). 
The Regulation contains some provisions that are also to be found in the IOSCO Code but 
that are now legally binding. On the other hand, some important points of the Code have not 
been incorporated into the EU Regulation. This is unfortunate because it is unclear what role 
the IOSCO Code should now play in the EU. It is not intended that the Regulation should 
replace the established process of recognizing ECAIs. The ECAIs already recognized in the 
EU should apply for registration in accordance with the Regulation (European Parliament 
2009: Article 2a). 
A registration procedure has thus been introduced that will enable European supervisors to 
monitor the activities of CRAs. The primary objective of the Regulation is to avoid the 
existing and potential conflicts of interests between CRAs and the organizations they rate. 
The key points of the Regulation are: 
1.  Scope 
Credit institutions (i.e., banks) may only use “for regulatory purposes” ratings that have 
been issued by a CRA that is registered within the EU, or satisfies the equivalence 
criteria in the Regulation. 
2.  Registration and supervision of CRAs 
The Regulation establishes a mechanism for CRAs to be registered with their home 
member states’ competent authorities, and for their EU affiliates to be supervised 
through a “college of supervisors” coordinated and moderated through the CESR. 
3.  Equivalence and endorsement 
For recognizing the ratings of instruments and entities given by CRAs outside of the 
European Community: 
(a)  Registered CRAs can endorse the ratings of entities or instruments given by 
their affiliates outside of the European Community provided that (among 
other things) 
(i)  the registered CRA can verify on an ongoing basis that the conduct 
of the third-country CRA operates under a no-less-stringent 
supervisory regime; 
(ii)  there is an objective reason for the rating to be performed in the 
third country rather than within the European Community; and 
(iii)  there is an “appropriate” cooperation agreement in place between 
the national regulator of the registered CRA and the third-country 
CRA’s regulator.  This way multinational CRAs may be able to 
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endorse within the EU the ratings given by their foreign affiliates, 
although it is critical that the Commission publishes a list of third 
countries with which such cooperation arrangements have been 
made. 
(b)  Ratings of third-country CRAs relating to third-country instruments or entities 
may be used by credit institutions for regulatory purposes provided that 
(among other things)  
(i)  there is a cooperation agreement between the Commission and the 
third-country regulator in effect; 
(ii)  the European Commission has adopted an “equivalence decision” 
confirming that the standards of regulation in the third country are 
equivalent to EU standards; and 
(iii)  the third-country CRA has been “certified” by CESR. 
4.  Withdrawal of registrations and transition periods 
If a CRA’s home regulator withdraws that CRA’s registration, there will be a transition 
period during which the CRA’s ratings of any investments or entity may still be used by 
credit institutions for regulatory purposes. This period is: 
(a)  ten working days where the rated investment or entity is also rated by a 
different registered CRA; or 
(b)  three months otherwise—a period that may be extended by the Commission 
in circumstances where there is “potential for market disruption or financial 
instability.” 
5.  Structured finance 
Structured finance instruments will have some sort of an “additional symbol” to 
distinguish them from other rating categories. CRAs will also be required to disclose 
information about the due diligence processes they have performed, loss information 
and cash-flow analysis, their assumptions, and the stress scenario simulations they 
have undertaken. 
There is a further restriction on the issuance of ratings for complex products: “where 
the lack of reliable data or the complexity of the structure of a new type of financial 
instrument or the quality of information available is not satisfactory or raises serious 
questions as to whether a credit rating agency can provide a credible credit rating, the 
credit rating agency shall refrain from issuing a credit rating or withdraw an existing 
rating.” 
6.  CRA internal governance and transparency 
The Regulation imposes standards of internal governance to ensure (among other 
things) that CRAs manage any conflicts of interests, have independent compliance 
departments, and review their rating methodologies periodically. 
Additionally, the analysts or persons who approve ratings must not “make proposals or 
recommendations, whether formally or informally, regarding the design of structured 
finance instruments on which the credit rating agency is expected to issue a credit 
rating.” 
CRAs are now subject to extensive disclosure requirements. They have to disclose 
their models, methodologies, and the basic assumptions on which their ratings are 
based. They must demonstrate that they have carried out their assessments on the 
basis of all the information available from reliable sources. An annual transparency 
report must also be published detailing not only their financial figures but also their 
systems of rotation. 
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Their supervisory or administrative board must include at least two independent 
members whose remuneration is not linked to the CRA’s performance. At least one 
member must be an expert on securitization and structured finance instruments. 
The Regulation also sets periods during which former analysts may not take up certain 
positions within entities that they have rated. 
The fact that banks are required to use the ratings of registered CRAs only for regulatory—
and not for wider—purposes is a favorable outcome for the banking industry. Earlier drafts of 
the Regulation envisaged that a potentially much broader scope of banking activities would 
require the use of ratings issued by registered CRAs. By linking the use of ratings issued in 
accordance with the Regulation to regulatory purposes (meaning compliance with European 
Community law), the scope is more clearly defined. 
Registration standards are maximum harmonization measures, meaning that no member 
state can impose threshold requirements in addition to, or higher than, those set out in the 
Regulation. Given the purpose and scope of the Regulation, this is appropriate. 
The endorsement approach is aimed at larger CRAs, and the equivalence approach at 
smaller CRAs without a group presence in the EU. While it is helpful in principle to set out a 
regime for recognizing third-country ratings equivalence, it is not yet clear how endorsement 
criteria will be satisfied or what the exact procedure will be for concluding cooperation 
agreements and making equivalence decisions. Nor is it completely clear what constitutes 
“equivalence.” In particular, the substantive requirements of the Regulation—against which 
equivalence will be judged—are more detailed and extensive than the international IOSCO 
Code of Conduct. This may restrict the ability of CRAs to obtain equivalence rulings. 
The idea of an additional symbol proposal has been floated for some time; the IOSCO Final 
Report of May 2008 included a similar proposal. Politically desirable as it may be, this 
requirement may confuse investors and suggest that there is some qualitative difference 
between structured finance and other ratings. For regulatory capital purposes—
i.e., determining the applicable credit quality step assigned to a rating—the additional symbol 
is unlikely to make a difference. 
This raises the question as to what the additional symbol will achieve. If the credit quality of 
a structured product is inferior, why should this not be reflected in a lower rating? And if it is 
not inferior, why do we need the additional symbol? Certainly, one of the overall challenges 
for regulators is to ensure that published ratings capture qualitative differences between 
various types of rated entities or instruments. Given that structured instruments are 
fundamentally different from corporate bonds and behave in very different way, the 
additional symbol may be seen as part of the response to this challenge. 
While it is possible that the additional disclosure requirements for structured finance 
instruments may help some investors in their investment decisions, they may also serve to 
diminish investor appetite for such instruments. The concern is that, having been provided 
with this additional information, some investors may balk at the idea of spending the extra 
time and effort needed to review it. Furthermore, although it may seem common sense and 
sound business practice for CRAs not to issue ratings if the complexity of the instrument or 
amount of available information does not permit satisfactory analysis, enshrining this point in 
the Regulation may have the effect of stifling financial innovation. 
From the banks’ point of view, the final version of the Regulation contains a number of 
improvements on the initial proposals and drafts. These include the restriction of the 
Regulation’s scope to ratings used for regulatory purposes, the twelve-month window before 
regulatory capital will be affected, and the transitional arrangements so that ratings can 
continue to be used temporarily if registration is revoked. For CRAs, the Regulation imposes 
an additional administrative, disclosure, and supervisory burden; for agencies that already 
comply with the IOSCO Code, however, the adjustments required to be Regulation-
compliant may be less onerous than those they have already carried out. For third-country 
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CRAs looking to do business in the EU, and for EU banks wishing to buy securities rated 
only by third-country CRAs, the Regulation’s impact may be considerably harsher. 
9.  WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? 
The responsibility borne by credit rating agencies (CRAs) for the financial crisis has been 
analyzed in depth by policymakers and various expert groups over the last eighteen months. 
Some of the proposed reforms went much further than the changes set out in the European 
Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies. Expectations of the Regulation’s impact should 
therefore not be unduly high. Policymakers are well aware of this and see the Regulation’s 
primary objective as being to address the problem of conflicts of interests. As things stand, 
there is a good chance that this can be achieved. 
Given the limited scope of the selected approach, however, it is clear that it can only make a 
qualified contribution to stabilizing the financial system, namely in areas where the instability 
has been caused by conflicts of interests or general corporate governance problems. Key 
issues, such as the lack of competition in the ratings market, liability, and, above all, the 
procyclical impact of credit ratings, remain unresolved. It would go far beyond the scope of 
this paper to present detailed proposals for their solution. Instead, these concluding remarks 
will confine themselves to outlining which approaches appear the most promising from the 
perspective of the banks in Germany. 
While we are unlikely to see any meaningful proposals on liability beyond emphasizing the 
importance of ensuring that every single rating issued is of the highest possible quality, this 
does not apply to the other two issues mentioned. True, there is no simple solution to either 
problem. Competition between CRAs is desirable as it encourages high-quality ratings and 
their continuous improvement. Promoting more competition will be far from easy, however. 
The obstacles to entering the market are clearly extremely high. But facilitating market entry 
by offering political support for a European credit rating agency, for instance, would do little 
to boost quality through competition. The same goes for political intervention in the form of 
rules requiring a certain proportion of ratings to be issued by national or regional CRAs. 
One obstacle to more competition is the issue of who should pay for a rating. The current 
tight oligopoly is unlikely to be broken up under the existing “issuer pays” system because 
neither issuers nor CRAs have an interest in more ratings. Nevertheless, switching to an 
“investor pays” model should not in itself be expected to produce a quick fix. Whereas in the 
“issuer pays” model competition can lead to inflated ratings because the company chooses 
who should rate them, in the “investor pays” model there is a free rider problem, and it is not 
clear how the free market can resolve it. This dilemma could, however, be solved by 
decoupling the competition problem from the ratings market. The service required is an 
assessment of credit quality or the risk of default. A credit rating is only one of the 
instruments capable of performing this task. Credit default swaps, for example, fulfill a 
comparable function from an alternative starting point. If the relevant market is defined in this 
way, financial market regulation itself will automatically have a direct role to play in 
enhancing competition because by using ratings to regulate banks it contributes directly to 
the reduction in competition. 
Registration as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations or external credit 
assessment institutions places CRAs in a position of unqualified authority as the central 
source of information about the creditworthiness of bonds and structured finance products. 
This makes it clear that the competition problem is directly linked to the extent to which the 
regulatory use of ratings has exacerbated procyclicality in the financial system as a whole. 
The problem cannot therefore be resolved by increasing competition solely between CRAs 
but, above all, by seeking alternative approaches to assessing risk for regulatory purposes 
and thus for the purposes of determining capital requirements. Such a strategy has the 
potential to gradually reduce the role played by credit ratings in regulating the financial 
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markets. The need to reduce the dependency of regulations and supervisory practices on 
ratings is also seen by the US Treasury (2009). 
A different three-step approach to reduce procyclicality has been proposed by the 
International Monetary Fund. As a first step, policymakers should have a good grasp of the 
risk inherent in credit ratings. “Ratings maps” can offer a template for policymakers to 
identify the different channels through which rating downgrades can lead to systemic risk. 
Second, policymakers will need to measure risks inherent in ratings once they are identified. 
A useful method to measure the systemic exposure to downgrade risk during boom cycles 
would be for regulators and institutions to stress test their balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet positions. And finally, systemic institutions that are vulnerable to abrupt ratings 
downgrades may have to hold more capital or liquidity buffers (Sy 2009). 
Naturally, this call to seek alternative approaches to assessing credit quality is also 
addressed to investors. They should decrease their dependency on ratings by basing their 
investment decisions on a broader range of indicators. This could reduce the risk of ratings 
downgrades being followed by mass selling, write-downs, and additional capital 
requirements. The most promising indicators to consider would be those that reflect a 
deterioration in credit quality more swiftly than is the case with credit ratings.
11 
                                                  
11 For an in-depth discussion of these problems and for concrete proposals, see Partnoy (2009) and Dittrich 
(2007). 
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